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11. Introduction
Policy making is based on decisions under uncertainty, including the economic assessment of the 
demand and consumption of scarce resources over time, which prompts the need to evaluate 
government interventions by explicitly considering the temporal dimension of public decisions. 
The construction of a road, for example, incurs investment costs (that start several years before 
the actual project implementation), while it creates flows of socio-economic costs and benefits 
that appear all along the project life cycle. The history of economic evaluations of public projects 
has shown that cost-benefit analysis may then be a proper tool.
If policy makers take an investment decision by employing the Net Present Value (NPV) rule, 
then they need to utilize a social discount rate meant to capture the opportunity costs of delaying 
current consumption in order to make the investment concerned possible. According to a 
standard formulation of Squire and van der Tak (1975), the social discount rate should reflect 
“value judgements by the government [which] determine[s] the weight to be given to future 
consumption relative to present consumption” (p. 26).
However, the ordinary use of discount rates in economic research remains controversial. The 
transfer of the concept of discounting in business investment (typically used for short-term 
productive sector projects with tangible marketed outputs) to the appraisal of often long-term, 
system-wide and normally highly uncertain effects has, over the years, prompted considerable 
discussion among economists. This discussion is driven by the fact that, while the private sector 
has tangible alternatives for the choice of the appropriate discount rate (such as the cost of 
2acquiring capital), the social discount rate does not have a clear or unambiguous market-based 
foundation.
To cope with the above issue, a number of methods have been proposed in the early economic 
evaluation literature (Boardman et al. 2001):
 Using the marginal rate of return on private investment. Harberger (1969), for example, 
argued that public investment should outperform private investment in order to be financed 
by tax revenues; thus the rate of return on private investment is the opportunity cost faced by 
society when financing (through taxes) government capital expenditure.
 Using the weighted social opportunity cost of capital. Sandmo and Drèze (1971), among 
others, claimed that public investment crowds out private investment, thus producing the 
need to account for the opportunity cost of the use of resources used in the public project and 
which could be used by the private sector.
 Using the shadow price of capital. Eckstein (1958) and Bradford (1975) proposed to convert 
gains or losses resulting from an investment project into consumption equivalents. The 
proper conversion rate is then the shadow price of capital.
In recent years, a growing body of literature has considered the pure rate of time preference of 
individuals as a fundamental ingredient in the definition of the discount rate to be used in 
appraising public actions. This alternative originates from critical observations made by a 
number of well-known scholars in the field of cost-benefit analysis1 for whom individuals 
entering a social contract commit themselves to increase their total savings to invest in projects 
that produce net benefits for future generations. This behaviour results in a collective rate of 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Baumol (1952), Eckstein (1958), Marglin (1963), and Sen (1961).
3investment higher than the individual (i.e. private) preference rate. If this “isolation paradox” 
holds, then the discount rate for cost-benefit analysis should be below the private rate of return 
on savings, and reflects to some extent the individual time preference.
In this vein, the traditional Ramsey formula (Ramsey, 1928) captures both the pure time 
preference and other, more economically-oriented elements such as the expected growth rate of 
the economy and the risk associated with the relative uncertainty over future outcomes. 
According to Evans and Sezer (2004), the Ramsey formula for the calculation of the social time 
preference rate (stpr) can be approximated by the following simple expression:
stpr = r + g          (1)
where r is the individuals’ pure time preference;  is the absolute value of the elasticity of 
marginal utility of consumption; and g is the projected long-run annual growth of per capita real 
consumption. 
It is clear that the estimate of the stpr depends critically on:
a) an appropriate framework for defining r;
b) the assumed functional form of the utility function and its data approximation;
c) uncertainty about future economic conditions.
In recent studies (Evans and Sezer, 2004; Evans, 2004; Percoco, 2006), in the absence of strong 
empirical evidence, a 1-1.5% rate of pure time preference was suggested for some OECD 
countries (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA) in order to calculate the 
stpr.
4Recognizing the relevance and potential of individuals’ pure time preference as a basis for 
evaluation analysis, we offer in this paper a review of the empirical literature on the estimation 
of r on the basis of experiments conducted on individuals, or based on inferences from their
behaviour. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature on the time 
preference of individuals; we give special attention to what, in the literature, is commonly called 
“anomalies”. Sections 3 and 4 are a review of the early and contemporary debates on social 
discounting and the recent literature on environmental policy implications of different discount 
structures and/or rates respectively. In Section 5 we provide a summary and suggest pathways 
for future research.
2. Individual time preference
When studying the individuals’ time preference, we have to assume implicitly how psychology 
shapes human judgement, in this case, over time. Samuelson (1952) and Koopmans (1960) may 
be considered as the fathers of the Discounted Utility (DU) model, even though the historical 
origins of this approach can be found in early works of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, John Rae and 
Irving Fisher (Frederick et al., 2002). In the DU model, an intertemporal utility function, 
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The DU model has some interesting, though not always realistic, features (Frederick et al., 
2002), in particular:
a) a time-consistent preference, implied by the fact that in (2) the discount rate ris constant 
over the time horizon T;
b) a path-independent utility;
c) a time-independent consumption preference, i.e. the individual preference for consumption is 
not affected by past or future outcomes;
d) an independence of discounting from consumption, that is, the discount rate is not a function 
of consumption;
e) an integration of new alternatives with existing plans, i.e. additional consumption plans are 
evaluated by integrating them into current plans;
f) the instantaneous utility is constant for each given time interval;
g) a decreasing marginal utility.
However, as stated by Samuelson (1952) and demonstrated later on by Koopmans (1960), the 
DU model is not based on individual psychology, and hence it is not likely to be corroborated by 
empirical or experimental evidence. In what follows, we will highlight some prominent 
anomalies arising from empirical evidence on individuals’ behaviour.
62.1 Hyperbolic discounting
Almost all discounting applications use the exponential discount factor and consider the discount 
rate as constant and independent of the time horizon. The main problem with this assumption is 
that recent experimental evidence on individuals’ behaviour suggests that people’s discount 
functions are hyperbolic, i.e. discount rates decrease over time. This fact implies an 
inconsistency in individuals’ choices. An example taken from Kocherlakota (2001) clearly 
explains the behaviour underlying time inconsistency: “Jan is about to go out to her 
neighbourhood bar. Before drinking anything there, Jan would like to sign a legally binding 
contract stating that she is allowed to drink only four beers that night. Why does she want to sign 
such a contract? She knows that after having four beers, she will want to have a fifth, and she 
wants to prevent herself from doing so” (p. 13).
This example shows that Jan is exhibiting time-inconsistent preferences: her preferences for 
beer, at a given date and in a given state, may change over time without the arrival of new 
information.
Several models of time-varying discount rates have been developed and discussed by 
economists. Strotz (1956) was the first one who studied time-inconsistency in a dynamic 
framework. Phelps and Pollak (1968) introduced hyperbolic discount functions in an 
intergenerational context of consumption and saving. They captured taste for immediate 
gratification by means of a simple two-parameter model that modifies exponential discounting. 
Let ut be the instantaneous utility of a person in period t. Then his intertemporal preferences at 
time t, Ut, can be represented by the following utility function, where both   and   fall between 
0 and 1:
7 t tttt uU          (3)
The parameter   determines how time-consistently patient a person is. If  =1, then these 
preferences imply exponential discounting. But for  <1, these preferences are time-inconsistent.
Decrease in timing aversion has been observed in experimental studies concerning inter alia: 
people choosing between non-monetary alternatives2; people choosing between monetary 
alternatives3; animals choosing between types of food or between other alternatives4. The main 
justification for the adoption of the hyperbolic discounting utility function is empirical evidence 
in the cognitive psychology literature which contradicts the predictions of utility functions with 
stationary fixed discount rates. However, as argued by Harvey (1994), many of these studies do 
not examine the decrease in people's discount rate as it becomes large, but rather the increase in 
their discount rate as time intervals become small. 
In the empirical literature, there are two main types of experiments on the test of the hyperbolic 
discounting hypothesis. The first type was first discussed by Thaler (1981). Some people prefer 
‘one apple today’ to ‘two apples tomorrow’ to ‘one apple in one year’. Ainslie and Haslam 
(1992) report that “[…] a majority of subjects say they would prefer to have a prize of a $100 
certified check available immediately over a $200 certified check that could not be cashed before 
2 years; the same people do not prefer a $100 certified check that could be cashed in 6 years to a 
$200 certified check that could be cashed in 8 years”.  Experiments of this type have been 
replicated with choices involving a wide range of goods and a wide range of subject populations. 
The second class of experiments is discussed in Thaler (1981) and Benzion et al. (1989). 
Subjects were asked to imagine that they had won a sum of money in a lottery, and that they 
                                                          
2 See Christensen-Szlanski (1984); Cropper et al. (1994); Millar and Navarick (1984); Solnick et al. (1980). .
8could either take the money now or wait for an increased amount later. They were presented with 
several variations of the amount $x at time t and the amount $y immediately. Then we may say 
that the subject’s choice is consistent with the discount factor ),( trD  defined by the equation:
xtrDy ),(                     (4)
The results show that the average discount rate is decreasing in t. However, it was also found that 
r is not constant, but rather an increasing function of t. The larger the sum of money at stake, the 
higher (closer to 1) the discount factor5.
Rubinstein (2003), on the contrary, using experimental results, argues that the same sort of 
evidence which rejects the standard constant discount utility functions can reject hyperbolic 
discounting as well. Furthermore, a decision-making procedure based on similarity relations 
better explains the observations and is more intuitive. In summary, the findings of hyperbolic
time preference rates show much variation and do not lead to clear and conclusive results.
2.2 Other anomalies
Hyperbolic discounting has certainly been the most debated time preference anomaly in recent 
years. However, other anomalies have been found as well in a number of experiments.
Often individuals appear to have a discount rate lower for losses than gains, exhibiting what is 
called the sign effect. Experimental evidence of such an anomaly is provided by Thaler (1981) 
and later on by Antonides and Wunderink (2001). On the other hand, Shelley (1994) found that 
individuals discount more a loss delay than a gain delay.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
3 See Thaler (1981); Ainslie and Haendel (1983); Benzion et al. (1989); Horowitz (1996). 
4See Ainslie (1975); Ainslie and Herrnstein (1981).
9When small benefits are discounted more than large ones, we have the magnitude effect (Shelley, 
1993). There is a consensus in the academic community about this anomaly in discounting, and 
several studies have been conducted in order to provide some more in-depth information about it. 
In fact, it has been documented that the effect is greater for smaller amounts and short delays 
(see, amongst others, Kirby, 1997; Green et al., 1997).
The direction effect postulates that discount rates depend on whether a change in time of delivery 
of a benefit is perceived as an acceleration or a delay from a reference point in time 
(Loewenstein, 1988). This anomaly was interpreted by Loewenstein (1988) as evidence of the 
plausibility of ‘prospect theory’. For that paradigm, making an intertemporal choice means 
losing something at one time and gaining something at another. People’s loss aversion behaviour 
implies that the substitute outcome needs to be considerably larger to compensate for the loss. 
For delay, the substitute outcome is the later amount, and hence the direction effect increases the 
discount rate; for expediting, the substitute comes out earlier, decreasing the discount rate6.
The above description of the anomalies in individual discounting is certainly not comprehensive; 
it is mainly limited to those we think are more relevant from the viewpoint of social discounting 
and policy making7.
Table 1 reports a summary of the features, and a simple analytical sketch of the anomalies 
presented in this section.
<<Table 1 around here>>
                                                                                                                                                                                          
5 Keller and Strazzera (2002), by using data reported in Thaler (1981), examine the accuracy of the hyperbolic 
model vs. the exponential model and find a slightly higher effectiveness of the former.
6 Recently, Caplin and Leahy (2004) proposed some arguments for the analysis of a benevolent government in the 
light of prospect theory.
7 Besides the excellent paper by Frederick et al. (2002), a comprehensive survey on individual time preference 
features can be found in Read (2003).
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At this point, the shortcomings of using a constant pure time preference rate in equation (1) 
should be clear. As the social discount rate formula is linear in r, a particular functional form for 
that term would influence the functional form of the social discount rate. For this reason, the 
recent debate on social discounting has focused on the aggregate implications of intertemporal 
preference anomalies, and pointed out some of the possible outcomes when individual 
characteristics are taken into account. In the next section, we offer a review of the recent 
developments in the theory of social discounting in the light of the features of individual 
preferences.
3. Social discounting
3.1 The theory of social discounting and the early debate
The Social Discount Rate (henceforth denoted SDR), as defined by the stpr, describes the trade-
off between present and future consumption as a function of two components: a pure preference 
for present over future welfare (r), and another term (g) which indicates that, if the expected
growth in per capita consumption (g) is positive, then a unit of consumption in the future will 
yield less utility than in the present. The term  is the absolute value of the elasticity of marginal 
utility with respect to consumption (a measure of the relative effect of a change in consumption 
on welfare).
The basis for the formal analysis of the SDR is offered by the Ramsey’s (1928) classical growth 
model. In this approach, it is implicitly assumed that the economy reflects the preferences of 
individuals, and that “these preferences ought to be reflected in the societal decision making 
process” (Pearce et al., 2003). However, the consideration of intertemporal preferences is not 
11
without problems. Sen (1961) argues that, if in a democracy all people count in the decision 
making process, then there is no democratic solution to the intertemporal problem as future 
generations are not yet born. Eckstein (1958) argues that, if we consider the society to be driven 
by a sort of “consumers’ sovereignty”, then people’s preferences, including their intertemporal 
ones, should be taken into account.
In his original formulation, Ramsey (1928) assumes an ethical position stating that discounting 
“is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination” (Ramsey, 
1928). By relying on Arrow and Kurz (1970) and Koopmans (1960), Markandya and Pearce 
(1988) provide a simple derivation of the stpr, as defined in equation (1). Let us consider social 
welfare (W) at time t as a function of consumption at the same point in time (Ct), and formalized 
as:
11 )1()(    rttt eCCW             (5)
The present value of social welfare if the consumer maximizes his consumption stream is such 
that:
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Substituting the derivatives of (5) into (7) yields:
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stpr  1 ,          (8)
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Clearly, since 1C
dt
dC
 is the growth rate of consumption (g), we directly obtain (1).
As stated in Section 1, the empirical definition of the stpr depends on expectations of the growth 
rate of the economy, as well as on the pure time preference of individuals, as expressed by r, 
while both elements are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. For this reason, there is no 
consensus, neither in the economic literature nor among policy makers, on the value of the SDR 
to be adopted8. As a consequence, there is high volatility in the computation of the SDR in both 
scientific studies and in practical guidelines, as reported in Tables 2 and 3.
<<Tables 2 and 3 around here>>
In particular, Table 2 reports general discount rates for several industrialized countries. It is 
shown that they vary between 3.5% for France and 6% for the UK. Greater variation is shown 
for SDRs for carbon sequestration projects as reported in Table 3. The information given in this 
table should be considered only as an example of SDR variation for sector-specific projects; in 
fact, rates of discount may vary in the interval [0%, 10%].
3.2 The contemporary debate
From formula (1) or (8), it is clear that the estimation of the pure rate of time preference of 
individuals, r, is crucial for the definition of the stpr. Sen (1967) argues that people enter into a 
social contract, in which they commit themselves to increase their total savings above the level 
they would choose privately, exhibiting what is widely known as the “isolation paradox”. As a 
consequence, the SDR, if assumed to be just r, is lower than the market rate. Warr and Wright 
                                                          
8 Actually, Rabl (1996) proposes a completely different approach, where the classical discount rate is applied for the 
short term (less than 30 years) and the growth rate of the economy for the long term.
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(1981) claim that the “isolation paradox” does not necessarily imply a non-market SDR9. 
However, Newberry (1990), arguing against Warr and Wright (1981), shows that their analysis 
holds only under conditions of sub-optimal equilibria. In our opinion, the analysis in Sen (1967) 
points out the central role played by individuals’ preference in shaping public decision making, 
or, in other words, the fact that collective actions result from the aggregation of individual 
preferences.
As stated in the previous section, consumers’ time preferences are characterized by decreasing 
discount rates. One of the first attempt at studying hyperbolic consumers in the context of public 
policy was made by Cropper and Laibson (1999). They show that, if agents are quasi-
hyperbolic, then they consume more and save less, suggesting a role for the government to 
subsidize interest rates through public expenditure. In their analysis, they do not provide an 
explicit rationale to use hyperbolic discounting as a social practice. 
By explicitly addressing the aggregation issue, Gollier (2002) and Gollier and Zeckhauser (2003) 
demonstrate that the aggregation of preferences of exponential individuals leads to hyperbolic 
discounting of collective action outcomes. This result is very interesting, as it provides a 
convincing rationale for the use of time-declining discount rates. To this debate, additional 
arguments have been provided by Azfar (1999) and Weitzman (1998), who argue that the 
presence of uncertainty leads agents to have decreasing discount rates10. Weitzman (1998) also 
states that there are at least three reasons to use a time-declining discount rate in evaluating far-
distant future effects of a given project or policy:
                                                          
9 Horowitz (1996) shows that the choice of a non-market discount rate leads to time-inconsistent policy which is a 
feature of government action in several fields. For a survey on time inconsistent fiscal and monetary policy making, 
we refer to Catenaro (2000).
10 It should be noted that some arguments on uncertainty over future outcomes are also present in the analysis 
proposed by Gollier (2002) and Gollier and Zeckhauser (2003).
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a) there is strong empirical evidence that individuals use lower discount rates for events that 
occur farther into the future;
b) a sufficiently large positive discount rate gives negligible weight to costs and benefits that 
occur far into the future; using a time-declining rate avoids having to choose between 
ignoring very long-term environmental consequences (with a time-invariant, non-zero rate) 
and not discounting at all;
c) current market rates of interest or marginal rates of time preference reflect the preferences of 
individuals currently alive, not those not yet born. In other words, future impacts should have 
exactly the same weight as current impacts.
The second point, that is, a discount rate that declines over time and ascribes higher values to 
future net benefits, is a feature of particular interest for resource and environmental policy. In 
fact, many environmental projects and programmes are characterized by high short-run costs and 
net benefits that show up in the far distant future, and the use of a discount rate declining over 
time may lead analysts to accept a larger number of projects that produce environmentally-
benign outcomes. In order to highlight this fact, in the next section we review some of the most 
relevant literature on the effect of time-declining discounting on environmental policy in a broad 
sense.
4. Relevance of social discounting for resource and environmental policy
Since the publication of the seminal paper by Nordhaus (1994), it has become clear that the 
choice of the discount rate/function deeply affects the choice and the making of environmental 
15
policy11. Newell and Pizer (2001) find that costs and benefits in the distant future such as those 
associated with global warming, long-lived infrastructure, hazardous and radioactive waste, and 
biodiversity often have little value today when measured with conventional discount rates. They 
demonstrate that when the future path of this conventional rate is uncertain and persistent (i.e. 
highly correlated over time), the distant future should be discounted at lower rates than suggested 
by the current rate. They then use two centuries of data on U.S. interest rates to quantify this 
effect. Using both random walk and mean-reverting models, they compute the certainty-
equivalent rate, that is, the single discount rate that summarizes the effect of uncertainty and 
measures the appropriate forward rate of discount in the future. They estimate discount factors 
over the next 400 years based on a 4% rate of return in 2000. Discount factors are expressed in 
terms of the value today of $100 provided at various points in the future, that is, the discount 
factors multiplied by 100. After only 80 years, conventional discounting at a constant 4% 
undervalues the future by a factor of 2, relative to the random walk model. Going further into the 
future, conventional discounting is off by a factor of over 40,000 after 400 years. The mean-
reverting model produces less huge, but yet still significant, results, raising the discount factor by 
a multiple of about 130 after 400 years. It is noteworthy that the shortcomings of the constant 
discount rate (i.e. the exponential model) can be somehow overcome by using a time-declining 
discount rate (Newell and Pizer, 2001).
Similarly, Pearce et al. (2003) reported that the present value of the marginal damage of carbon 
emissions in the UK is extremely sensitive to different discount profiles. In particular, they find 
that by using a flat 6% discount rate, as suggested in the Green Book by the HM Treasury (1997) 
and reported in Table 2 of the present paper, the social cost of pollutant emissions is 
                                                          
11 For a different perspective, criticizing the characteristics of the model used by Nordhaus (1994), see Neumayer 
(1999).
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underestimated by almost 200% with respect to the case of discounting à la Newell and Pizer 
(2001).
Previous arguments and evidence thus call for a special care when discounting streams of costs 
and benefits of environmental policies and projects. In this vein, Weitzman (1994) was the first 
to propose an “environmental discount rate”. His line of reasoning runs as follows. A marginal 
investment creates economic growth as well as a need to increase expenditure to ensure that 
environmental quality remains unchanged. This cost reduces the return on investment, so that an 
adjustment of the discount rate is needed. Environmental expenditure is increasing over time, 
and hence the rate of discount should be considered as time-varying. Later on, this intuition led 
the author to formulate the analysis summarized in Weitzman (1998).
More recently, the link between discounting and sustainability has become more clear as  
discounting the future using declining discount rates implies a higher level of altruism with 
respect to the exponential function (Saez-Marti and Weibull, 2005). This is an important feature, 
as one of the requirements for sustainable development is the intergenerational equity, that is, an 
adequate level of intertemporal altruism. These results are substantially in line with the 
framework proposed by Chichilnisky (1996) to analyze sustainable development, where decision 
makers maximize the discounted value of net benefits and the well-being of far-distant future 
generations.
It is interesting to notice that, while the use of hyperbolic discounting is desirable from an 
environmental point of view, it has no negative effects on economic growth. In fact, Barro 
(1999) modified the neoclassical growth model to allow for a non-constant rate of time 
preference. He finds that if the household cannot commit to future choices of consumption, and 
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if utility is logarithmic, then the equilibrium resembles the standard results12. By explicitly 
considering environmental quality, Li and Lofgren (2000) find that a decrease of the discount 
rate in the long run increases the social welfare in the steady state of a classical development 
model.
It is noteworthy that the use of hyperbolic discounting is of enormous importance for what is 
considered to be the currently most relevant environmental issue, i.e. global warming. Karp 
(2004) addresses this issue and finds that, in the case of a benevolent government able to commit 
to future actions, optimal emissions (and consequent abatement) match the outcome under 
hyperbolic discounting.
All those arguments and results lead us to conclude that the SDR certainly matters in public 
choices as is witnessed by the literature on resource and environmental policy. As a 
consequence, the SDR should not be taken as a merely exogenous variable in the policy making 
process, it should be rather considered as a fundamental ingredient with which governments can 
shape the future of economies and societies.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have reviewed the literature on social discounting, and pointed out how 
individual preferences shape the social discount rate. However, people’s intertemporal 
preferences present some anomalies that undermine the validity of the classical model that relies 
on an exponentially discounted utility. One of these anomalies is that individuals present time-
decreasing discount rates, exhibiting what is widely called “hyperbolic discounting”. It has been 
                                                          
12 By relying on Barro-type growth models, Michel et al. (2004) conduct an extensive study on the effect of altruism 
on the effectiveness of fiscal policy. They find that when individuals have different degrees of altruism, public debt 
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pointed out that the use of hyperbolic discounting is rational in evaluating public policies if 
uncertainty affects future outcome and when the SDR results from the aggregation of 
exponential consumers. The use of such a function has some positive environmental policy 
implications when considering interventions showing net benefits occurring in the far-distant 
future, as in the case of policies against global warming. 
Finally, a word on future research, which we feel should be conducted mainly in two fields. 
Blundell and Stoker (2005) point out the importance of heterogeneity treatment in the estimation 
of economic aggregates. Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) provide some necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the aggregation of individual time preferences into a social aggregate under very 
strict conditions. On this point, by using large data sets, such as the households surveys provided 
by most industrialized countries’ governments or central banks, it would be interesting to 
investigate the cross-section distribution of individual discount rates, as well as to verify some of 
the basic theoretic postulates that can be drawn from the literature on the aggregation of 
preferences. Secondly, Laibson et al. (2004) propose the use of a general model to estimate 
individual discount functions by making use of simulated moments estimation procedures on 
data on credit card borrowing in the U.S. In the European context, it would be very useful to 
estimate such functions, as well as to investigate in this framework the impact of aggregation of 
time preferences.
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Table 1: Discount models and their characteristics
Model/Anomaly Choice Characteristics References
Exponential u(x1) = u(x2)
The discount factor is: 
t
r





1
1 Samuelson (1952)
Hyperbolic u(x1) = u(x2)=u(x3) The discount factor is


 



 t1
1
 that approximates 
a discount factor with r(t)
Loewenstein and Prelec 
(1992)
Sign effect u(x1
+) = u(x2
+)
u(x1
-)=u(x2
-) 




2
1
2
1
x
x
x
x  r+>r-
Antonides and 
Wunderink (2001); 
Thaler (1981)
Magnitude effect u(x1
S) = u(x2
S)
u(x1
L)=u(x2
L) S
S
L
L
x
x
x
x
2
1
2
1   rL>rS
Shelley (1993)
Direction effect u(x1) = u(x2
D)
u(x1
E)=u(x2)
2
1
2
1
x
x
x
x E
D
  rD>rE
Loewenstein (1988)
NOTES: This table relies on results and notation in Read (2003). In the second column “Choice” are the choices an 
individual faces when testing different models/anomalies. In the third column “Characteristics” are the main results 
from the experiment/model.
LEGENDS: The sign “=” means that the individual has to make a choice or to reveal a preference. For instance, 
u(x1) = u(x2) means that an individual is asked to reveal his discount rate for which he is indifferent in having x at 
time t=1 or at time t=2. Subscripts denote time t= 1,2,3; r is the discount rate; are parameters of the generalized 
hyperbolic model. Superscripts’ meanings are as follows: +: gain; -: loss; S: small; L: large; D: delayed; E: 
expedited.
Table 2: A sample of Social Discount Rates across countries
Country Social Discount Rate Source
Australia 4.7% Evans and Sezer (2004a)
Canada 5.2% Kula (1984)
EU 5% European Commission (2002)
France 3.8% Evans (2004)
France 3.5% Evans and Sezer (2004)
Germany 4.1% Evans and Sezer (2004)
Italy 3.7-3.8% Percoco (2006)
Japan 5.0% Evans and Sezer (2004)
UK 4.2% Evans and Sezer (2004)
UK 3.71-4.84%* Evans and Sezer (2002)
UK 6% HM Treasury (1997)
USA 4.6% Evans and Sezer (2004)
USA 5.3% Kula (1984)
(*) The range is due to different assumptions on altruistic behaviour
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Table 3: Social Discount Rates for Carbon Sequestration Projects
Country Social Discount Rate Source
Brazil 0-5% Fernside (1995)
Global 6% Nordhaus (1991)
Malaysia 0-3% Ismail (1995)
Malaysia 6-10% Boscolo et al. (1997)
Norway 2-7% Hoen and Solberg (1994)
USA 4-8% Moulton and Richards (1990)
USA 10% Adams et al. (1993)
USA 2.5-10% Stavins (1999)
USA 4% Parks and Hardie (1995)
USA 2-10% Englin and Callaway (1995)
NOTE: This tables relies on data reported in Boscolo et al. (1998).
